University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1973

Public trust in our national forests| Development of an
administrative framework for public administration of
environmental resources
James Peter Betty
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Betty, James Peter, "Public trust in our national forests| Development of an administrative framework for
public administration of environmental resources" (1973). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers. 3335.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/3335

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

THE PUBLIC TRUST IN OUR NATIONAL FORESTS: DEVELOPMENT
OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
by
James P. Betty
B.A., University of Montana, 1967

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
University of Montana
1973

Approved by:

Chairman, Board of Examiners
^sY ///

Dea:

Date

Iraduate Divisipn

UMI Number: EP34124

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI'
DiMMrtattm PlMMng

UMI EP34124
Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

uesf
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
X.

Page
INTRODUCTION

1

Direction
II.

7

THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC TRUST
Trust Law
Public Trust
History
Scope

III.

IV.

10
13
15
17

THE PUBLIC TRUST IN OUR NATIONAL FORESTS ...

23

Public Administration Under the
Trust Doctrine
Forest Service Legislation
U.S. Forest Service Trustee Relationship . .

23
24
25

A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE

39

The Public Trust in the Lincoln Back
Country
The Setting
The Trustee Relationship
Enforcing the Public Trust
Federal Government Jurisdiction
Standing to Sue
Substantive Issues
V.
VI.

10

39
40
44
48
49
51
54

IMPLICATIONS

59

CONCLUSIONS

63

BIBLIOGRAPHY

68

ii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
According to Charles Reich in his widely read article
Bureaucracy and the Forests, "the forests of our nation are
a vast experiment in public ownership.It would be as
accurate to state that the forests of our nation are a vast
experiment in public administration.

Article IV, Section

III, of the United States Constitution, is the source of
power for the Congressional delegation of broad, sweeping
powers to specific governmental agencies for the administra
tion of the national

^ The subject of this paper

forests.

will be limited to the United States Forest Service admini
strative procedure as it affects the agency's interaction
^C. A. Reich, "Bureaucracy and the Forests" (Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara,
California, 1962).
^The Forest Reserve Act of 1897 (30 Stat. 34, 16 U.S.C.
551) imposed upon the Secretary of the Interior the duty to
"preserve the national forests . . . from destruction" by
regulating their "occupancy and use." In 1905 these duties
and powers were transferred to the United States Forest Ser
vice under the Department of Agriculture by the Act of Feb
ruary 1, 1905 (33 Stat. 628, 16 U.S.C. 472). Today, three
executive agencies control the nation's forests: the Forest
Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the National
Park Service and the Bureau of Land Management, both in the
Department of Interior. This paper will address itself par
ticularly to the Forest Service because it administers the
largest share of the nation's forests and all of the public
lands reserved as "national forests."
1
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with the public.

The author will superimpose the doctrine

of public trust upon the Forest Service responsibility of
"public" administration for the purpose of highlighting any
present weaknesses, and to describe the potential of the
doctrine as an administrative framework for public admini
stration of environmental resources.
Since the early 1960's, the Forest Service has come
under some particularly sharp public criticism.

Adverse

environmental impacts on national forests have become matters of public record and concern.3

Government agencies,

often held out as the "whipping boy" for the environmental
ills of the country,^ are alleged to be self-perpetuating,
bureaucratic monoliths often unresponsive to public interC
ests.
The Forest Service is not immune from these allega^W. F. Lally, "Crisis on the Public Lands," Suffolk
University Law Review (Vol. 6, Fall 1971). pp. 104, 107-110.
See also: University of Montana "Bolle Report," (S. Doc.
91-115, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 14, 1970). This report con
cluded that citizen concern for Forest Service management
was based upon U.S.F.S. "overriding concern for sawtimber
production" and its "insensitivity to the related forest
uses . . . and the public interest in environmental values."
New York Times, November 14, 1971, p. 60, Col. 2. New York
Times, November 15, 1971, p. 48, Col. 1.
^L. L. Jaffe, "The Federal Regulatory Agencies in
Perspective: Administrative Limitations in a Political
Setting," Boston College Law Review (Vol. 11, May 1970),
p. 565.
^See generally: Ibid., pp. 565, 569, "bureaucracies
tend to become somewhat ingrown, attached to their own con
cepts of policy and resentful of outside pressures, particu
larly those which they feel they can ignore." Also: C. A.
Reich, "The Public and the Nation's Forests," California Law
Review (Vol. 50, August 1962), p. 381. R. L. Ottinger, "Leg-
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tions.

This onslaught of citizen confrontation is placing

demands on the administrative functions of the agency as the
Forest Service relates to concerned public interests.

Citizens

are battling in the courtroom,® seeking to limit agency dis
cretion through mandatory

? advocating "environO
mental management" of public forests, and demanding a new set
legislation,

islation and the Environment: Individual Rights and Govern
ment Accountability," Cornell Law Review (Vol. 55, 1970),
p. 666. See also: Testimony of J. L. Sax before the Commit
tee on Conservation and Recreation, House of Representatives
of Michigan, on H.B. 3055, January 21, 1970: "Official agen
cies which are created to promote and protect the public inter
est sometimes become too single-minded. In the past few years,
a number of cases have brought home the degree to which impor
tant regulatory agencies failed to take into account all the
information and all the perspectives which a proper regard
for the public interest required."
C.

Jaffe, o]3. cit., p. 568. "In a period in which many
of the agencies have settled into unenterprising routines,
the courts have set about to reawaken these agencies to their
responsibilities for active and forward-looking decisions."
See also: J. L. Sax, "The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention," Michigan
Law Review (Vol. 68, January 1970), p. 473. "Private citizens
no longer willing to accede to the efforts of administrative
agencies to protect the public interests, have begun to take
the initiative themselves." Also: Sierra Club v. Hickel
(N.D. California, July 23, 1969); overruled by Sierra Club v.
Morton (92 S.Ct. 1361, April 1972). Parker v. United States
(309 F. Supp. 593, D. Colo., 1970). The West Virginia High
lands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co. (Civil #70182~E,
N.D. W. Va., June 1970). Gandt v. Hardin (Civil #1334, W.D.
Michigan, 1969).
"^Wilderness Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. 1131-1136). National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-190). The
Scapegoat Wilderness Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-395).
8

S. A. Cain, "Environmental Management and the Depart
ment of Interior," Politics, Policy and Natural Resources
(Edited by D. L. Thompson. New York: Free Press, 1972), pp.
354-362. See also: L. K. Caldwell, "Environmental Manage-

of relationships between the Forest Service and themselves.^
By the beginning of this decade, the cry for public
participation in the Forest Service decisions affecting the
allocation of resources and uses on public forest land was
being taken seriously.

To the credit of the Forest Service,

it took the initiative to implement a number of programs
designed to involve the public in inventory, planning, and
decision-making stages of national forest management.
This change in administrative procedure has been documented
as a transition from "professional unilateral" to "democratic
participatory" decision-making within Region I of the United
States Forest Service.

The question of whether any signi

ficant change in the Forest Service administrative procedure
has occurred is beyond the scope of this paper.

It can be

said with certainty, however, that legislation affecting the
Forest Service relationship to the public has not been signi
ficantly altered.
ment," Environment: A Challenge for Modern Society (New York
Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 161-251. Also: I. M.
Hegman and R. H. Twiss, "Environmental Management of the Pub
lic Lands," California Law Review (Vol. 58, 1970), p. 1364.
^A. W. Bolle, "Public Participation and Environmental
Quality," Natural Resources Journal (Vol. 11, July 1971),
pp. 497-505. See also: Lally, oja. cit., pp. 104-122.
l°Region I of U.S.F.S. has employed "public involvement
in the following national forest land-use planning units:
Beartooth and Absaroka Primitive Areas, Rock Creek, and the
Burnt Fork.
W. Behan, "Wilderness Decisions in Region I,
U.S.F.S.: A Case Study of Professional Bureau Policy Making,
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley, 1971).
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The Forest Service is being challenged to adapt its
procedures to a rapidly changing system of social values.
American society is beginning to place a lot of importance
on environmental quality, and at the same time has become
critical of placing "blind faith" in industrial development.
In this era of uncertainty, the Forest Service can be expected
to look at its enabling legislation and the fundamental tenets
of professional forestry for direction.

It is the opinion of

the author that neither the legislation nor the professional
tenets provide a meaningful framework for the public admini
stration of national forests today.

Felix Frankfurter

addressed the problems of the Thirties by stating:
It is idle to feel either blind resentment
against 'government by commission' or sterile longing
for a golden past that never was. Profound new forces
call for new social inventions, or fresh adaptations
of old experience. The 'great society', with its perme
ating influence of technology, large-scale industry,
and progressive urbanization, presses its problems; the
history of political and social liberty admonishes us of
its lessons. Nothing less is our task than fashioning
instruments and processes at once adequate for social
needs and the protection of individual freedom.12
The purpose of this paper is to develop the public trust
doctrine as the "instrument" that could fit the environmen
tal needs of public forest management in the Seventies.

An

important feature of this paper is an understanding of the
potential of the doctrine as an administrative framework for
12f. Frankfurter, "The Task of Administrative Law,"
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (Vol. 75, 1927), pp.
614, 617-618.
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the future uncertainties that are likely to face the
Forest Service and other resource agencies in their inter
action with the public on the allocation of forest uses
and resources for the "public good."

Direction
The motivation behind the author's applying the
public trust doctrine to public administration of nat
ional forests should be made clear at the outset. First,
it is the author1s opinion that the real potential of
the doctrine is in its application at the administra
tive level of the executive branch of government.

Many

articles have been written describing the doctrine as
the basis for a citizen's right to enforce judicially
the "public interest" in any particular environmental
issue.

This "judicial" application of the doctrine is

very attractive, but does not necessarily develop the
full potential of public trust law as it might apply
to the day-to-day environmental management being car
ried out by government administrators today.

Second, the

author feels that Forest Service legislation and case
law suggests that elements of "public trust law" are
already woven into the ownership and administration of

7

national forests and into the benefits derived from
that forest land.

Third, it is the author's opinion

that there is no well defined administrative frame
work from which the Forest Service is basing its "pub
lic involvement" programs.

Involving the public in the

administration of the national forests is an attractive
concept, but could turn out to be a pandora's box of
"confusion and ineffectiveness" without fundamental
guidelines from which to make professional land-manage
ment decisions.
The approach taken in this paper proceeds from
the known to the unknown.

A description of the basic

concepts of American trust law and the public trust
doctrine make up the second chapter. The author was
not able to find any significant material that applied
the doctrine of public trust directly to government ad
ministration, therefore, chapter three is a combination
of identifying elements of public trust law in Forest
Service legislation and case law, and an elaboration
on the application of the doctrine to Forest Service
administration of public lands.

The fourth chapter is

an effort to superimpose the public trust doctrine
on a case study in "unilateral" decision-making by the
Forest Service.

This type of analysis can. serve to

8

point out the weaknesses in the administrative procedure
that the Forest Service has to fall back on today, and
at the same time suggest what differences a public
trust "framework" might make if similar facts were to
surface today.

The fifth chapter is a consideration

of the implications that can logically be drawn from
the application of the public trust doctrine to the For
est Service administration of public forest lands.
The hypothesis to be tested in this paper is
that, despite the limited recognition of the public
trust doctrine in law (i.e., legislation and case law),
there is inherent in the laws of this country and the
United States Forest Service a public trust in our
national forests; that the resulting trustee relation
ship provides a sound administrative framework for the
Forest Service environmental management of the national
forests; and, that this "framework" is comprised of
definitive powers and duties of the agency, and rights
of the public to protect and promote the national forests
for both present and future generations.
So to avoid any misconceptions, the author is not
claiming that there is either a Congressional enactment
or judicial recognition of a public trust in our national
forests. If, however, the aforesaid hypothesis is valid,
then a logical response might be to seek Congressional

9

enactment and/or judicial recognition of the public trust
doctrine as the administrative framework for the Forest
Service and perhaps other government agencies responsible
for administering environmental resources.

CHAPTER II
THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC TRUST
Trust Law
American law recognizes a comprehensive body of trust
law, but public trust theory has slipped into the background
of judicial thought until recently.

For purposes of this

paper, the author defines the doctrine of public trust as
the intention to impose legal obligations upon at least two
designated parties for the continuance of an interest held
in common by all members of the public.

There are fundamen

tal elements of trust law that should be understood before
considering the public trust doctrine as a legal framework
for administering environmental interests by governmental
agencies.13
A "trust" is a fiduciary relationship^ between at
l^The following material on trust law primarily orig
inates from the most widely used reference books in the
field of trust law: G. G. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of
Trusts (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1963); A. W.
Scott, Abridgment of the Law of Trusts (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1960); American Law Institute, Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, 2d ed., Vol. I (St. Paul, Minn.: American
Law Institute Publishers, May 1957).
^ F i d u c i a r y relation:
A person in a fiduciary relation
to antoher is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other
as to matters within the scope of the relation. American Law
Institute, ibid., p. 7.

10
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least two parties with respect to property resulting from
an intent to create the trust.15

The two parties are essen

tially a trustee and a beneficiary.

The trustee is the per

son who holds legal title to the trust property for the
benefit of another.

The beneficiary is the person who has

equitable title and for whose benefit the trust property is
being held or used by the trustee.

For example, this paper

will be considering a government agency to be the trustee
of certain public property for the benefit of the public as
beneficiary.

The trust property is the interest in the

subject matter of the trust.

That interest is separated

into a legal interest (held by the trustee) and an equitable
interest (held by the beneficiary).^
There must be some manifestation of an intention to
create a trust relationship before a trust is recognized in
law.

The trust intent is usually written in a trust instru

ment, which is the document vesting property interests in
the trustee and beneficiary.

The trust terms are often

spelled out in the trust instrument as rights, powers, and
duties of the parties for the purpose of promoting and prol^ibid., p. 6.
l^The distinction between equitable and legal interests
originates from the historical separation of legal and equit
able courts. Today, the only distinction is that equitable
rules and remedies that attach to equitable interests are more
flexible than most rules of law. Equitable title is usually
a non-possessory interest in property. Black's Law Diction
ary, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1957).
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tecting the trust.

If the terms are not expressly excluded,

then the usual rights and duties of the parties apply as
defined in the substantive body of trust law.
7
There are two major reasons for creating a trust.1'
The first is simply to dispose of property, which is accom
plished by the transfer of legal title to a trustee.

The

second reason for the creation of a trust is to establish a
personal relationship involving rights and duties between
the beneficiary and the trustee.

Today most trust law has

been built up around the former reason for creating a trust.
On the other hand, the public trust doctrine emphasizes the
relationships between the parties to the trust.
Under general trust principles, the trustee is ex
pressly empowered under the trust instrument, or has implied
powers as equitably deemed necessary to carry out the pur
poses of the trust.

Upon acceptance of the trust by the

trustee, the trustee is accountable for the following affirm
ative duties unless expressly excluded in the trust instru
ment:

to administer the trust; to be loyal to the benefici

ary; not to delegate those acts he can reasonably perform;
to keep and render accounts; to furnish information to the
beneficiary upon request; to exercise reasonable care and
skill; to take and keep control of the trust property; to
protect and to preserve the trust property; to enforce claims
Ibid., p. 2.
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by the trust; to keep the trust property separate; to make
the trust property productive; to pay income to the benefi
ciary; to deal impartially with beneficiaries; to act in
accord with the exercise of the power delegated to persons
under the trust, if that exercise of power is not in viola
tion of the trust terms.
The duties of the trustee are enforceable by the bene
ficiary.

The equitable remedies,^ usually more flexible

than legal remedies, of the beneficiary are as follows:

to

compel the trustee to perform his duties; to enjoin the trus
tee from committing a breach of trust; to compel the trustee
to redress a breach of trust; to appoint a receiver to take
possession of the trust property and administer the trust; to
remove the trustee.
Public Trust
The doctrine of public trust, as defined from the
Common law, applies the aforesaid principles of trust law
to "public trust property."

A critical point in understand

ing the doctrine of public trust is that "public trust prop
erty" is basically an interest in the subject matter of the
J-^Ibid., pp. 341-432.
•^Equitable remedies are based upon principles of
justice and right, rather than the sanction of positive law.
Black's Law Dictionary, op. cit.
2Pop cit., p. 433.
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trust that is important ts the citizenry as a whole.

The

state or quality of the natural environment is important to
the general public as they rely on certain resources and uses
that accrue from that environment.

Therefore, it would seem

logical to consider the implications of juxtaposing the pub
lic trust doctrine with the public administration of the
national forests—which are a significant part of the natural
environment.
According to Joseph L. Sax, a professor of law at the
University of Michigan and noted authority on the public
trust

doctrine,21

the public trust doctrine is based upon

three related principles:
First, that certain interests—like the air and the sea—
have such importance to the citizenry as a whole that it
would be unwise to make them the subject of private
ownership. Second, that they partake so much of the
bounty of nature, rather than of individual enterprise,
that they should be made freely available to the entire
citizenry without regard to economic status. And,
finally, that it is a principal purpose of government to
promote the interests of the general public rather than
to redistribute public goods from broad public uses to
restricted private benefit.22
21professor Sax has authored two major works on the
public trust doctrine and a model environmental protection
act, parts of which have been incorporated into several state
acts. See generally: J. L. Sax, Defending the Environment
(New York: Knopf Publishing Co., 1971); J, L. Sax, "The Pub
lic Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judi
cial Intervention," Michigan Law Review (Vol. 68, January 1970),
p. 473; J. L. Sax and R. L. Conner, "Michigan's Environmental
Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report," Michigan Law Review
(Vol. 70, May 1972), p. 1004; J. L. Sax, "Environment in the
Courtroom," Saturday Review (October 3, 1970), pp. 55-57.
22Ibid., Defending the Environment, p. 165.
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These principles have provided conceptual support for the
public trust doctrine being an important legal theory for
environmental law.

The popular concept of the doctrine is

that environmental interests in the air, water, soil, wild
life, etc. are so inherently important to the public as a
whole that they are held in trust by government for the
benefit of all present and future generations of people.
History
The doctrine of public trust originated in Roman and
English Common law.Historically, people have long sought
to protect public property rights in rivers, the sea, and
the seashore.This notion that public uses of particular
natural resources were of special importance has carried over
to American law.2^

Our courts have rarely applied the doc

trine of public trust, however.

Those few cases that have

applied the doctrine dealt with lands under navigable waters,
? "3For historical treatment, see e.g. W. Buckland, A
Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 182-85, 2d
id (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1932);
R. Hall, Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the Privileges
of the Subject in the Sea Shores of the Realm, 2d ed. (Cam
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1875); J.
Angell, A Treatise on the Rights of Property in Tide Waters
and in the Soil and Shores Thereof, 1st ed. (Cambridge, Eng
land: Cambridge University Press, 1826).
2^Sax,

See also:

ojo. cit., Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, p. 475.
Magna Carta and Northwest Ordinance.

25sax, ibid. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)367',
(1842). Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
(1892); U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, (1913).
2(^In re. Crawford County Levee and Drainage District No.
1, 182 Wise. 404, 196 NW 874, cert denied 264 U.S. 598 (1924).
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parklands,27 shorelands,^8

ancj wiia

animals in nature.

Historically, the public rights recognized as basic
tenets of water law have never existed in public land law.
Individuals have had no separate interests in public land,
but have been considered an amorphous body for whose welfare
the public land was administered.

The public body had no

defined legal rights in public land.30

jn 1889 the U.S.

Supreme Court recognized the concept of "public trust" in
the public domain as a governmental obligation to "protect"
and "invest" the trust:
The public domain is held by the government as part of
its trust. The Government is charged with the duty and
clothed with the power to protect it from trespass and
unlawful appropriation, and under certain circumstances,
to invest the individual citizen with the sole posses
sion of the title which had till then been common to
all the people as the beneficiaries of the trust.31
Congress had the power to regulate public lands, and according
to this case was placed in the position of being responsible
for managing the public lands held in trust by the Federal
27Davenport

v. Buffington, 97 F. 234 (8th Cir. 1899).
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410, 215
N.E. 2d 114 (1966).
2®Shrively

v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).

2^La Costa v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545
(1924). Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
30j. e. Montgomery, "The Public Trust Doctrine in
Public Land Law: Its Application in the Judicial Review of
Land Classification Decisions," Willamette Law Journal (Vol. 8,
June 1972), pp. 135, 152.
31U.S.

v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1889).
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Government.

The management of the national forests was sub

sequently delegated to the U.S.F.S.

This case also stands

for the proposition that Congress was in the position, "under
certain circumstances," to invest legal title to parcels of
the public domain in individual citizens.
Generally, the doctrine of public trust is unsettled
as to the difference between the general government obliga
tion to act for the public benefit, i.e. the government
police power, and the affirmative and more demanding duty
which the government would have as trustee.

A trustee is

directly accountable to the beneficiaries of the trust,
within the clearly established terms of the trust. This
sharp delineation of responsibility and accountability on
the part of the trustee, is central to the hypothesis of this
paper.
Scope
Joseph Sax, in his extensive research of public trust
cases, has found that courts have held three types of "trust"
restrictions on governmental authority:
First, the property subject to the trust must not
only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held
available for use by the general public; second, the
property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent?
and third, the property must be maintained for particu
lar types of uses. The last claim is expressed in two
ways. Either it is urged that the resource must be held
available for certain traditional uses, such as naviga
tion, recreation, or fishery, or it is said that the

18

uses which are made of the property must be in some
sense related to the natural uses peculiar to that
resource.32
The scope of the public trust doctrine is much broader
than has been historically applied in American courts, accord
ing to

There seems to be sufficient latitude in the

Sax.

limited number of court decisions (involving the doctrine)
for applying the procedural and substantive protections of
the "public interest" to government administration of public
land.

The nature of public and private interests in the

allocation of benefits derived from public lands can be said
to be

34 Bernard Cohen addresses this change:

changing.

The evolutionary shift from inalienability of public
lands to protection of private property rights can prob
ably be explained by the search for "progress" in an age
of rapid technological advance. As Mr. Whitney's cotton
gin increased production and Mr. Fulton's steamboat
plied the navigable waters of a new land in the midst of
an industrial revolution, it was assumed that production,
navigation, and commerce were the national interest.
Protection of the environment was relegated to a secondary
role.35
Cohen goes on to say that the trust doctrine has "passed
through Whitney's cotton gin, emerging somewhat shredded."36
32sax, op. cit., p. 477.
91 S2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957).

See also:

Hayes v. Bowman,

33sax, ibid., p. 556.
3^The issue of balancing interests in environmental
issues usually centers upon the effects on economic progress
in our free enterprise system.
35b. S. Cohen, "The Constitution, The Public Trust Doc
trine, and The Environment," Utah Law Review (Vol. 3, 1970),
pp. 388, 389.
3^ibid.
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Today, the application of the public trust doctrine is becom
ing important as protection of the environment has been ele
vated to a primary role in public policy by both Congress
and the courts throughout the country.
The public trust doctrine is still considered "to
have the breadth and substantive content which might make it
useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking
to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource manage
ment problems."37

The doctrine has received prominent atten

tion in recent years from the point of view that it is a
legal theory establishing a citizen's right, in his capacity
as a member of the public, to sue for protection of the "pub
lic interest" in the environment.38
This judicial application of the doctrine has inherent
weaknesses:

First, the approach deemphasizes the administra

tive and political realities that dominate the day-to-day
management of natural resources; second, courts are not best
equipped nor are they in the best position to make technical
or value decisions in the public interest; third, judicial
intervention, i.e., "suing the bastards," has a dramatic
appeal to environmentalists, but the courtroom is not usually
considered a panacea for the lojig-term environmental ills of
37sax, ojd. cit., p. 474.
38see footnotes 21, 30 and 35.
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the country.^9

The emphasis upon the enforcement of the pub

lic trust seems at best remedial.
The strength of the doctrine lies in the development
of a democratic, administrative framework responsive to the
public interests in a productive and liveable environment.
The doctrine provides the essential elements for a clear
determination of a "check and balance" interaction between
government administration and the public for managing the
environment.

Administrative specialization and expertise

found in governmental agencies,and public participation are
necessary for managing the complex environmental resources
of the twentieth century.

The strength of the doctrine comes

both from the rights of the public to make value determina
tions as to the proceeds they wish to derive from the trust,
together with the duties and powers of the public agencies
to make physical determinations in promoting and protecting
the trust.
The tenets of the doctrine can be most advantageous
to public resource agencies in defining and limiting their
responsibilities to environmental management. Due to the
broad and often ill-defined enabling legislation of many
resource agencies, they are often placed in what seems to

H. Hanks and J. L. Hanks, "The Right to a Habit
able Environment," The Rights of Americans. (Ed. by N. Dorsen,
1971), pp. 147, 170. See also: R. Beazley, "Conservation
Decision-Making: A RationalizationNatural Resources
Journal (Vol. 7, 1967). p. 345.
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be an untenable position of determining both the biological
constraints, and the public demands on a particular parcel
of public land.

The Forest Service, for example, is equipped

to deal with the biological considerations of forest land
management.

Not even "philosopher kings," however, are in

a position of effectively determining public wants and needs
as they relate to the resources and uses that could accrue
from public forest lands.
What was once a relatively easy determination of pub
lic values has become a difficult task for public administra
tors today.

Concerted market interests (i.e., free play of

economic forces determining the resource and use demands on
public land) have been in the position of influencing public
agencies to exploit natural resources, because until recently
the diffuse nature of ecological interests (i.e., balance of
biological forces determining the resource and use demand
on public land) provided little effective countervailing
political pressure.

The public trust doctrine could be effec

tive if it served to place the professional forest manager
in the position of managing for present productivity and
long-term protection of national forests.

This could place

the task of determining public needs and wants back into the
political arena, with the agency (i.e., trustee) acting only
as a "catalyst" to the resolution of diverse public interests,
and ultimately "registering" the value decisions of the
^Reich, op- cit., p. 13.
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public.
The following chapter considers whether the doctrine
has the potential of differentiating between the trustee
responsibility for the principle of the trust (i.e., manage
ment of physical and biological characteristics of the
trust), and the beneficiary responsibility for the trust pro
ceeds (i.e., determine the use and benefits of trust income).

CHAPTER III
THE PUBLIC TRUST IN OUR NATIONAL FORESTS
Public Administration Under the Trust Doctrine
There is no explicit legislative enactment of the pub
lic trust in our national forests.

Judicial interpretation

of natural forest legislation and "courtmade" law in general
point to an implicit recognition of the trustee relationship
between the public and the United States Forest Service.
There are a number of reasons for Forest Service personnel
to consider the public trust doctrine as a framework for
environmental management, the most significant being the
clarification of their responsibility for managing public
forest lands.
It is understandable, in light of the recent prolifer
ation of environmental lawsuits and the current interest in
the public trust doctrine,^ that governmental agencies might
react in a defensive manner toward the doctrine.

Ralph A.

MacMullen, past Director, Michigan Department of Natural Re
sources, spoke to the contrary when he responded to being
sued by citizens under Michigan's Environmental Protection
Act of 1970:42
41see footnotes 5 and 38 with accompanying text.
42Michigan

Comp. Laws Ann. 691.1201-691.1207 (Supp. 1972).
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It is true that the Natural Resources Commission, upon
my recommendation', approved construction. ... It is
likewise true that suit has been brought under the Envir
onmental Protection Act by persons who disagree with that
decision. The Act—one of the landmark pieces of environ
mental legislation in the nation—was passed for precisely
that reason; to allow dissenting citizens an opportunity
to register their dissents in court. Even though we have
been made the defendants in this suit, we welcome it as
an expression of public interest in the environment, and
another step toward redefining the law so that we can
better interpret the wishes of the people.43
Although judicial enforcement of the trust is a significant
factor in the doctrine, the strength of the trustee relation
ship is in the clearly defined responsibilities of the parties
to the trust, thereby serving to lessen conflict between the
Forest Service and public in this case.

Conflicts that do

arise will tend to be more of a political nature between the
beneficiaries, generally outside the arena of public admini
stration, and so should not result in negative environmental
impacts.

The costs of political maneuvering would tend to

be more social or economic in nature, especially where resource
agencies are accountable for protecting the environment through
time.
Forest Service Legislation
The Constitution empowers Congress to dispose of and
make needful rules and regulations for the public lands.^
43Letter to the Editor, State Journal (Lansing, Michi
gan, January 28, 1972), A-6, CoIT EZ
44u.S. Constitution, Article 4, Section 3, paragraph 2:
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all need
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States." See also: U.S. v.
City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); U.S. v.
Gratiat, 14 Pet. 526, 537.

25

In March of 1891, Congress delegated that power by authorizing
the President of the United States to "set apart and reserve
. . . whether of commercial value or not, as public reserva
tions"^ the forested lands within the public domain.

Pub

lic use of and the necessary administration of these forest
reserves were made legal by the National Forests Organic Leg
islation of 1897.46

It wasn't until 1905 that these delegated

powers were placed in the newly formed United States Forest
Service in the Department of Agriculture.47

Today, the Fed

eral Government controls nearly 3/4 billion acres of public
domain.

Over 200 million acres of these federal lands, a

diversified resource of timber, minerals, rivers, mountains,
wilderness, and aesthetic beauty, are being managed by the
Forest Service.48

U.S. Forest Service Trustee Relationship
Elements of the public trust in our national forests
can be developed to serve as an administrative framework for
defining the bounds of professional forest mangement, and
the right of the public to participate in the allocation of
45Act of March 3, 1891, 16 U.S.C. 471, 26 Stat. 1103.
46sundry Civil Appropriations Bill of 1897, 16 U.S.C.
471, 30 Stat. 35.
47Act of February 1, 1905, 16 U.S.C. 472, 33 Stat. 628.
48This 3/4 billion acres is about 1/3 of the total
acreage of the United States. See: Public Land Law Review
Commission, "One Third of the Nations Lands: A Report to the
President and to Congress," (1970), pp. 21, 28.
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of national forest resources.
such a framework when he said:

Reich suggested the need for
"The standards Congress has

used to delegate authority over the forests are so general,
so sweeping, and so vague as to represent a turnover of virtu
ally all responsibility.1"^

The trustee relationship, on the

other hand, is usually construed by the courts as placing
broad, discretionary authority (within the expressed terms
of the trust) in the trustee to protect and make productive
the trust property, and as giving the beneficiary the right
to enforce the trust and deal with the proceeds of the trust
(unless specified otherwise) in his best interest.
The proceeds of the trust often depend upon how the
trustee decides to "invest" the trust property.

It would not

seem extraordinary for the trustee to confer with the benefi
ciary on the needs and wants of that beneficiary, so to, in
fact, make the trust "productive" in the best interest of the
beneficiary.

The specific application of this trustee rela

tionship within the Forest Service will follow a discussion
of the identifiable elements of the public trust in our
national forest.
The legal interest that American citizens had in pub
lic land was long ago transferred to the government in ex
change for the government's promise to allocate uses and
^Reich, o_£. cit., p. 3.
ton:

^A.
Scott, Abridgement of the Law of Trusts (Bos
Little, Brown and Co., 1960). pp. 365-370, 398-401.
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resources of that land for their benefit.

In McColloch

v. Maryland, a landmark case in the interpretation of the
unenumerated powers of the United States under the Consti
tution, the court said:
The Government of the Union, then . . .is, emphatically,
and truly, a government of the people. In form and in
substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted
by them and are to be exercised directly on them, and for
their benefit.51
This transfer of power to the Federal Government, and the
establishment of a beneficiary relationship between the
people and the government, present the fundamental elements
of a public trust in those property interests the public
believes are essential for quality living by the citizenry
as a whole.
As early as 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case
U.S. v. Beebe held that, "The public domain is held by the
government as part of its trust."^2

Subsequently, the Pres

ident of the United States was granted authority to set aside
and protect forest reserves "for the use and necessities of
the citizens of the United States."53

These public forest

reservations were set aside for specified public uses, and
were later referred to in our courts as public lands held in
"trust" for the public as a whole.

In 1910, in the case

5117 U.S. C4 Wheat) 316, 404-405 (1819).
52127

U.S. 338, 342 (1889).

53sundrey Civil Appropriations Bill of 1897, ojp. cit.
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Light v. United States, the Supreme Court of the U.S. held
Forest Service regulations limiting private grazing rights
on national forest lands to be constitutional because, "the
government hold (sic) public lands in trust, for the people,
to be disposed of so as to promote the settlement and ulti
mate prosperity of the States in which they are situated."54
The Supreme Court in that same case recognized a revocable
public trust in forest reserves when it stated:
'All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for
the people of the whole country.' . . . And it is not
for the courts to say how that trust shall be admini
stered. That is for Congress to determine. The courts
cannot compel it to set aside the lands for settlement;
or to suffer them to be used for agricultural or grazing
purposes; nor interfere when, in the exercise of its
discretion, Congress establishes a forest reserve for
what it decides to be national and public purposes. In
the same way and in the exercise of the same trust it
may disestablish a reserve and devote the property to
some other national and public purpose. These are rights
incident to proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of
the United States as a sovereign over theproperty belong
ing to it.
This case marked a turning point for the public trust doctrine
in that the decision was primarily based upon the proprietor
ship doctrine (i.e., the government owns the public lands)
and only made limited mention of the public trust.56

That

"limited mention" is very important, however, because it
established the fact that only Congress can "establish" or
54220

U.S. 523, 530 (1911).

55ibid.,

p. 536.

5^Supra, p. 10.
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"disestablish" the public trust in our national forests.
Further mention will be made on the effect of the proprietor
ship doctrine upon the public trust in our national forests.
The important point to keep in mind is that the government,
as trustee, would hold legal title to the forest reserves
and thus clearly have "rights incident to proprietorship."5*7
The Forest Service is now under the broad, sweeping
mandate of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Forestry Act of
1960.58

in accord with this Act, Congress did not decide to

"disestablish" the public forest reserves, but did, in fact,
broaden the terms of the public trust in our national for
ests.

This Act directs that "it is the policy of the Congress

that the national forests are established and shall be admin
istered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and
fish, and wildlife purposes," and "that the establishment and
maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent with the
purposes and provisions of section 528-531 of this title."59
This mandate to the Forest Service also repeats the directive
of earlier national forest legislation by stating that manage
ment of the national forests will be employed that "will best
meet the needs of the American people . . . and provide the
maximum benefit for the general public.
57Montgomery, oja. cit., pp. 157-60.
5816

U.S.C. 528-531.

59lbid. , 528, 529.
60Ibid.,

531(a).
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The Multiple Use Act states nothing about national
forest "productivity" being synonymous with the generation
of revenue from forest practices such as logging. The legis
lation states that consideration must be given "to the rela
tive values of the various resources, and not necessarily the
combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return
61
or the greatest unit output."
Market interests in the envir
onment "appear to be consistently favored by the administrative
agencies over 'non-economic' uses such as wildlife protection
and recreation."

It would be naive to harbor the belief

that the Forest Service is not conscious of this political
pressure by market interests, and perhaps resource agencies
are eager themselves for a respite from such pressures.

The

Forest Service "public involvement" programs would indicate
this at least.

However, it would be equally as naive to suppose

that this public agency is not feeling the heat of a groundswell
of citizens' interest in the environment today.
Political pressure groups, such as Sierra Club, Wilder
ness Society, and others, are beginning to balance the market
demands that have been ever present on the national forests.
But, neither the public nor the Forest Service have yet
61Ibid.,

531(a*.

® Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 138-39: "This favoritism
stems from political pressure . . . as a result of statutory
revue (sic) sharing arrangements which funnel a fixed percen
tage of the receipts produced from the recovery of public land
natural resources back to the local government unit in which
the federal land is located."
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realized that "instrument" or "process" for arriving at a
meaningful complement for achieving a balance of all these pub
lic interests, that will still allow the forest manager suffi
cient latitude for environmental management of our national for
ests.

The U.S.F.S. "public involvement" programs seem to be di

rected at determining public interests, but could prove to be
distracting from the task of environmental forest management by
not limiting the political involvement of public administrators.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, is in
accord with the public trust doctrine as applied here on the
federal level:
. . . it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy, to
improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs,
and resources to the end that the nation may—
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
. . .63
Federal courts have recently said that governmental agencies
can no longer approach their responsibilities as "umpires
blandly calling balls and strikes," rather, they have an
affirmative duty to thoroughly and openly study an issue
before acting in the public

jt is important to

interest.

recognize, as Charles Reich eloquently puts it, "that in a
democracy the 'public interest' has no objective meaning
63public Law 91-190, sect. 101(b)(1). See generally:
Hanks, op. cit., "Environmental Bill of Rights."
64Hanks, op. cit., The Rights of Americans, p. 169.
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except insofar as the people have defined it; the question
cannot be what is 'best' for the people, but what the people,
adequately informed, decide they

"65 The National

want.

Environmental Policy Act provides for this "public participa
tion" in the decision making processes of administrative
government, in addition to framing a national policy for a
decent environment:

"The Congress recognizes that each per

son should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person
has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and
enhancement of the environment."

The U.S.F.S., within the

Department of Agriculture, does come under this national man
date of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
This brief look at Forest Service enabling legislation
and the judicial interpretation of some of those laws strongly
suggests an implicit public trust in our national forests.
The national forest reserves were set aside for particular
public purposes, the public was designated beneficiary of the
reserve, and the Forest Service was delegated the authority
of a trustee for the management of those forest reserves.
Based upon court interpretations of public trust cases and
the implicit public trust in our national forests, it could
be said that:

the national forests should be managed for

public purposes and yet be available for use by the general
^Reich, op. cit., p. 10.
^Public Law 91-190, sect. 101(c).
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public; the specified interests of the forest land should not
be sold, unless by Congressional declaration; and the forests
should be maintained within natural capabilities and produc
tivity over the long run.^7

The present Forest Service

directives of "multiple use" and "sustained yield" tie in
well with this public trust administrative framework. Further
elaboration, however, should serve to point out some substan
tive differences and, most important for this paper, some
significant procedural differences between present public
administration and prospective public administration based
upon the public trust doctrine.
Important to the public trust doctrine is the comple
ment between the duties and powers of the trustee for man
aging the trust, and the rights of the beneficiary to enforce
Co
the terms of the trust.
The result can be a complementary
interaction between these parties for maintaining a "produc
tive" public trust.

The trustee is accountable for making

the trust "productive," but the trustee is seldom, unless
expressly stated in the trust terms, placed in the position
of making value determinations for the

beneficiary.^

This

would suggest that the Forest Service, as trustee, would not
6?See footnote 15 and accompanying text.
6^Supraf pp. 10-13.
^Scott, oj5. cit., pp. 283-287: Spendthrift trusts,
discretionary trusts, and trusts for support can be excep
tions where the trustee is placed in a position of determin
ing what is "best" for the beneficiary.
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be placed in the political position of reconciling the great
diversity of public interests and values in public forest
lands.

The agency might best serve as a "catalyst" for this

political process of public value determinations.

Involving

the public in the initial stages of forest land-use planning
could provide reciprocal understanding by the public and the
agency of the constraints and values to be considered in a
particular land-use decision.

Accountability on the part of

the Forest Service would be limited to their assuring present
"productivity" and guaranteeing long-term alternative uses
of the nation's forests.

The public would have the right to

define what mix of resources and uses was in their best
interests.
Although beyond the immediate scope of this paper,
brief mention should be made on the logistics of political
reconciliation of diverse and perhaps conflicting public
interests in public forest land.

The essential point here

is that the public administrator, as trustee, would be cata
lytic to political determination of the "public good."
Public involvement at all levels of Forest Service planning
provides a "quasi-political" format
public interests.

for reconciliation of

If the public interests are polarized,

then greater public visibility must be achieved through
Congress or, if necessary, through the courts.

A more diffi

cult problem here is just how to weigh or even tally public
inputs:

What about the problem of national versus local,
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informed versus uninformed, large special interest groups
versus individual expressions of public interest, etc.?
There is an important point to make in uncovering this "quag
mire."

The public trust framework for public administration

is basically a conceptual delineation of responsibilities
between the administrator and the public, so that the resource
administrator does not get caught in this "quagmire" of polit
ical reconciliation of diverse and/or conflicting public int
erests to the detriment of the natural environment he is
responsible for managing.

Further development of this prob

lem could easily provide the substance of another major paper
and, therefore, must be left for another time.
Under the trust doctrine, the public could directly
participate in Forest Service resource and use decisions
(i.e., proceeds of the trust), and the agency would have
discretionary powers for actual forest land management
(i.e., protecting and promoting the principle of the trust).
The public demands for particular forest resources and uses,
as determined between participating public interest groups,
would define a "productive" trust, if those demands were
within the natural capabilities of the trust property.

The

Forest Service, as trustee, would be accountable for the
final land management decisions.

This accountability can

be translated into "how well" the Forest Service is able to
"fill" the public demands for certain proceeds from the trust,
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within the physical and biological constraints of that public
trust property.
The Forest Service, again as trustee, could present
alternative management plans that would, in their profes
sional judgment, "fit" the capabilities of the forest land.
This would place the agency in the position of advocating the
best management practices for the land for present "produc
tivity" (to fill present public needs and wants) and future
alternative uses.

Close interaction with the various public

interests during this planning process would place the agency
in a good position to predict the particular mix of proceeds
the public would like to see coming from the public trust
land.

The ultimate decision of which alternative (or combin

ation of those presented by the agency) management plan would
best fit all the represented public interests, would be a
decision for the public within the political arena.

The

Forest Service would have to register this decision by the
beneficiaries of the trust and abide by it if it was within
the natural capabilities of the forest land being considered.
Professor Reich notes, "Lawyers know from long experi
ence that disinterested, well-considered decisions are most
frequently reached by clearcut separation between those who
advocate and those who

"^0 This "separation" is

decide.

possible under the trust doctrine, as the trustee advocates
^^Reich, oja. cit., p. 6.
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what land management practices are best for the trust prop
erty, and the beneficiaries decide what proceeds are in
their best interests.

The trustee, however, is accountable

for continuing the trust and therefore must make the final
decision as to what investment will be made for the trust.
Trust law preference for continuance of the trust and
prohibition of the invasion of the body of the trust would
place the burden of documenting the reasons why the trustee
proceeded with a certain management plan upon that trustee.
This burden of proofand substantive trust law would put
the Forest Service in the position of basing its decisions
on sound technical data, and preparing public records on how
and why particular management decisions were made.
Forest Service proprietorship?2 does not lessen the
grounds for a public trust in the national forest.

Legal

title to national forests rests with the U.S. Government and
equitable title rests with the public.

This point refers

back to the citizens giving certain interests over to the
U.S. Government in return for the public benefits of govern
ment administration, and is in accord with the two reasons
earlier stated for designating a trust relationship.Not
L. Jaffe, "Administrative Law: Burden of Proof
and Scope of Review," Harvard Law Review (Vol. 79, 1966).
pp. 914, 920.
also:

?2Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 526 (1840).
Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 158-60.
?^Supra, p. 12.

See
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only has there been a land transaction from the people to
the government, but a definitive trustee relationship could
be interpreted as having been established between the Forest
Service and the public.

CHAPTER IV
A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE
The Public Trust in the Lincoln Back Country
August 20, 1972, marked the end of a seemingly end
less struggle between environmentalists^ and the Forest
Service over the fate of 240,000 acres of de facto
ness land in northwestern Montana.^5

wilder

on that day, the "Scape

goat Wilderness" Bill was signed into law by the President of
the United States.

This struggle was popularly referred to

as the "Lincoln-Back Country Controversy,"*^ and arbitrarily
commenced on March 27, 1963, when the Forest Service made
public their "Long Range Plan" for development of 177,000

74"Environmentalists" will represent both conserva
tion and environmental interests, for the purpose of this
paper, as looking out for the ecological interests of landuse rather than market interests.
75scapegoat Wilderness Act, Public Law 92-395.
^For complete development and analysis of this con
troversy, see: R. W. Behan, "The Lincoln Back Country Con
troversy: A Case Study in Natural Resource Policy Formation
and Administration," (Unpublished paper, University of Mon
tana, 1969); and D. R. Kendall, "The Lincoln Back Country
Controversy: A Case Study of Public Land Administration,"
(Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Montana, 1970).
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acres of national forest land in northwestern Montana.^7
The ensuing controversy was a model example of low-profile
decisions made "for the people's benefit" by governmental
agencies.

This chapter will serve to review the facts of

the Lincoln-Back Country and to apply to them the previously
discussed tenets of the public trust doctrine.

This appli

cation of a trustee relationship between the public and the
Forest Service should serve to demonstrate the practical use
of the doctrine by all three branches of government, with
particular emphasis placed on the advantages to the admini
strative process in managing our forest resources.
The Setting
The Long Range Plan, as it was presented, was to have
sweeping effects on a land area well over twice the size of
the Lincoln Back Country, but it was the inclusion of this
area of land which proved to be the "call to arms" for many
environmentalists.

The Back Country was a well known land

unit encompassing 75,000 acres of national forest within the
planned development area.

The Back Country had gained an

identity as a wilderness-type recreation area over years of
use by outdoor enthusiasts throughout Montana as well as the
rest of the country.

Despite this accepted fact, neither

77;Long Range Plan, Northern Half Lincoln Ranger Dis
trict, Helena National Forest (U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service, Northern Region, March 1963).
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the general public nor environmental interest groups were
made aware, prior to the issuance of the Long Range Plan, of
the U.S. Forest Service consideration to develop these
177,000 acres of public land.

The Long Range Plan called

for timber harvest, recreation development, dispersement of
hunting and fishing, and construction of related roads into
this de facto wilderness.
In 1960, the Lincoln Back Country Protective Associa
tion was formed as a citizens effort to:
. . . encourage protection of wilderness, water, wildlife,
forest and field; to seek wise use of land and water in
broad public interest, nurture and improve wildlife stocks;
and restore and rehabilitate wildlife environment.
To sponsor and support legislation designed to end
methods and activities destructive to natural resources
and to institute methods seeking to replenish and renew a
sound resources economy.78
Perhaps the formation of this organization, three years before
the appearance of the Plan, was an intuitive response in
anticipation of a threat to the Lincoln Back Country.^9

By

the summer of 1962, the Association began enlisting broad
public support for protecting the "wilderness" encompassed
in this 75,000 acres of national forest.

It was also about

^^Constitutional By-Laws of The Lincoln Back Country
Protective Association, Article 2 (Unpublished, Lincoln, Mon
tana).
7®The Multiple Use Act of 1960 had just recently passed.
In addition the Forest Service was in the process of transi
tion from an era known as "custodial management" to what is
now recognized as "intensive management"; see also, M. Clawson
and B. Held, The Federal Lands; Their Use and Management
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1957), pp. 29-36.
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this time that the Helena National Forest Advisory Council
voted six to two in favor of supporting the Forest Service
in their long range multiple-use planning for the Lincoln
Ranger District.

It was later pointed out that the Council

was thinking in terms of hundreds of years, rather than the
five or ten years being considered by the U.S.F.S. as long
range planning in this case. The Council was composed of the
following private citizens during the Back Country controversy:
The Chairman, the owner of a Helena hardware store
A farmer, representing the water users and irrigation
interests
The owner of a large sheep ranch
A professional educator
A cattle rancher
A commercial guide and packer
A logging contractor from Lincoln
A representative from a smelting and refining company
in Helena
A Helena newspaperman
The owner of one of the cafes and motels in Lincoln
A representative of the State Board of Equalization
A representative of the State AFL-CIO^O
Three members were absent when the vote was taken, and the
chairman did not vote.
The public announcement of the Forest Service Long
Range Plan met with quick and intense public opposition.
Resistance coalesced around the feeling that the Forest Ser
vice had acted in a deceptive manner, and developed from a
strong public sentiment for the Lincoln Back Country per se.
Environmental groups were conspicuously absent from an advance
mailing of the Long Range Plan by the Forest Service.
^Behan, op. cit., p. 17.

On
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April 19, 1963, a public "meeting" was held upon a public
request for a "hearing."

An equal time regulation was en

forced at the meeting and a public request for a vote of dis
approval was denied by the U.S.F.S.

Concerned citizens were

beginning to realize the unwillingness and seeming inability
of the U.S.F.S. to respond to expressed public interest against
development of the Lincoln Back Country and contiguous national
forest land.
The efforts by citizens and environmental groups to
"delay" implementation of the Long Range Plan, at least until
a thorough resource study could be made, were thwarted by
what seemed to be determined efforts of the Forest Service
to develop this public forest land area.^ These citizens
called upon the Montana Congressional delegation in despera
tion.

Wilderness classification for the Lincoln Back Country

was proposed during the 1965

Congress.^

jt

j_s

ironic to

note that neither of the parties to this controversy was
originally asking for wilderness classification.

Six years

of Congressional proposals for wilderness classification and
four proposals by the Forest Service for development of this
national forest land intervened before the Forest Service
came on record as recommending wilderness classification of
81see footnote 4 and accompanying text.
82senate Bill 107, and House of Representatives Bill
7366.
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this area in August, 1971.®^ The Scapegoat Wilderness is a
reality today, and we are left wondering if the public inter
est was served by this confrontation between the Forest Ser
vice and the environmental interests.^

Perhaps wilderness

classification of this area was more the result of the defen
sive reactions on the part of both parties to this contro
versy, than the expressed public interest in a wilderness use
of the area.
The Trustee Relationship
The important feature of the trust relationship is
the complementary interaction between the citizenry and the
Forest Service to promote the "usufruct"®^ of our national
forests.

Usufruct, in this case, would be the public benefit

derived from government management of the present use of the
national forests without altering the long-term use options
proposal: Scapegoat Wilderness, Helena, Lolo,
and Lewis and Clark National Forests, Montana (U.S. Depart
ment of Agriculture, Forest Service, August 1971).
84Perhaps

wilderness classification in this case was
simply the result of a public emotionally reacting to the
defensive posture that the Forest Service assumed at being
rebuffed in their effort to define the "public good" in for
est land management.
8^A. w. Scott, Abridgment of the Law of Trusts (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1960), p. 19. "Many of the functions
which are performed in the Anglo American system by the use of
the trust were performed in the Roman Law through the usus or
usufructus . . . and in the modern civil' Taw by the modern
equivalents of these devices." The presumption of this paper
is that no equivalent of "usufruct" has yet been adapted to
public forest management.
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of the particular forest site involved.
As stated earlier, there is a trust law preference for
continuance of the trust and the prohibition of invasion of
the principle of the trust.8^ This preference could be trans
lated by the courts into a specific duty by the Forest Service
to maintain the natural uses of a particular forest site if
o7
this meets with approval by public interest groups.
The
Lincoln Back Country was de facto wilderness and had limited
alternative use

potential,**8

and, therefore, it could be said

under the public trust doctrine that the Forest Service acted
in derogation of its affirmative duty to protect the trust,
when it attempted to develop the Back Country, especially
without consulting the most vocal of public interests concerned
with the area.
The terms of the trust, as derived in particular from
the Multiple Use Act of 1960, provide optional land uses for
QQ

J

management,

including wilderness.

That legislation, how

ever, does not clearly define the duties and powers of the
8®See

footnote 71. See also: State v. Cleveland and
P.R.R., 94 Ohio 61, 80; 113 N.E. 677, 682 (1916).
on

See footnote 32. The example of an appropriate use
of San Francisco Bay is often used as an example to show what
a "natural" or "traditional" use would be. A public trust
imposed upon the Bay area would allow construction of a dock
or marina but would not allow filling the Bay with garbage or
for a housing project.
po
°°Kendall, op. cit., p. 11.
8916

U.S.C. 528-531.
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the Forest Service as trustee, and rights of the public as
beneficiary.

A commensurate accountability and responsibil

ity should attach to each of these respective duties and
rights.
Under the public trust doctrine, the courts might
construe a public right to impose the citizens' wishes upon
the administrative decision-making process insofar as they
wish to demand certain uses and resources from the public
trust.

The Forest Service would have the complementary

duty of providing the public with all relevant information
for determining the potential of the forest land.

This duty

includes the development of a complete record of all techni
cal considerations and alternative forms of management.

In

Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Com
mission, Judge Paul R. Hays held:
The record on which it bases its determination must be
complete. The petitioners and the public at large have
a right to demand this completeness. It is our view, and
we find, that the Commission has failed to compile a rec
ord which is sufficient to support its decision. The Com
mission has ignored certain relevant factors and failed to
make a thorough study of possible alternatives to the
Storm King project.
As in the above case, the Forest Service failed to conduct a
thorough resource study of the Lincoln Ba,ck Country, and
failed to offer alternative plans until 1971, that were based
9^354 F2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied 384 U.S.
941 (1966).

47

upon the public interests in the area.®-'-

In addition, the

broad range of public interests were excluded from the deci
sion-making process at several levels; in initial studies,
on the Helena National Forest Advisory Council, and in the
advance mailing of the Plan.®2
The proceeds that result from investment of trust prop
erty must be "reasonable" and within the terms of the
trust.National forest legislation sets out directives,
that could be considered trust terms, for forest mangement
that "will best meet the needs of the American people . . .
and provide the maximum benefit for the general public."
It seems only reasonable that the trustee in this case would
confer with the beneficiaries to realize what their "needs"
were, so to provide "maximum benefit" for them.

The Forest

Service in the Lincoln Back Country Controversy did not ade
quately determine the "needs" of the public, or, more approp
riately, did not allow the political process to work out the
"public interest" in that case.

The public turned to Congress

to counter the Forest Service "determination" to develop
this public land.

Concerned citizens seemed to have no other

effective checks upon the agency.

The trust relationship

could have provided initial agency interaction with the
public, allowed the political process to run its natural
9-^-See also: Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. U.S.,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
® 2Supra , p. 40.
93scott, crp. cit., pp. 359, 370.

48

course, and if necessary, could have served to establish the
citizens' rights to judicially enforce the public trust in
the Lincoln Back Country.
Enforcing the Public Trust
Did the members of the Lincoln Back Country Protective
Association^ have an enforceable public right to be informed
of, and involved in, a prospective change in the status quo,
regarding classification and use of the Lincoln Back Country
as managed by the U.S. Forest Service?

Does the public have

a legal right to a thorough resource study of the relative
values involved in the Lincoln Back Country and an impartial
report of such a study with alternative management plans by
the U.S.F.S.?

According to trust law, the beneficiaries of

the public trust in our national forest have equitable reme
dies^ for enforcing the terms of the trust and the duties
of the trustee.Initial consideration will be given to
whether the Lincoln Back Country Protective Association's
differences with the U.S.F.S. would be subject to court
action for protection of public interests in our national
forests in 1973.
94supra,

A brief discussion of the legal application
4^

9^An "equitable remedy" is a means by which a natural
right or justice is enforced under the more flexible rules of
equity. Some examples would be writ of mandamus, injunction,
specific performance, and recission in equity.
96supra. p. 13.
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of the public trust doctrine to the merits of this case will
follow.
Federal Government Jurisdiction
Litigation in this case doesn't appear to require a
waiver of sovereign immunity and authorization of judicial
review by the U.S. government.

There are generally two excep

tions to the rule of sovereign immunity:

first, where an

agent's powers are limited by statute and his actions are
beyond that scope of power, and second, where an act is unconstitutional or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.97
Usually in cases that are similar to that anticipated here,
review is granted under Section 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
•or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action with
in the meaning of the relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof.98
Section 704 provides in part:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court are subject to judicial review
. . .99
These statutory provisions establish Congressional
intent to make final agency action reviewable in the federal
9^Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337

U.S. 682 (1949).
985

U.S.C.A. 702.

"ibid., section 704.
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courts unless otherwise provided.There is no right of re
view where a statute precludes judicial review or where a deci
sion is committed to the discretion of an a g e n c y . F o r e s t
Service legislation gives no express provisions precluding
judicial review.

The question of "discretion" is explained

in Knight Newspapers, Incorporated v. United States:
A court may not review a decision committed to the dis
cretion of an agency pursuant to a permissive type sta
tute, but may do so where the decision was made pursuant
to a mandatory type statute, even though the latter deci
sion involves some degree of discretion.^03
Decisions by the Forest Service under the Multiple
Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, have been found by the courts
to be mandatory and subject to judicial review.In Gandt
v. Hardin, the court concluded that in regard to the Multiple
Use Act of 1960, "Congress was not enacting a permissive
statute, but rather adopted a mandatory statutory list of
factors to be considered in the development of the national
forests.

Tjie

mandatory nature of the Multiple Use legis-

lOOAbbot Industries v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
"Only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a
contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access
to judicial review."
1015

U.S.C. 701a.

1^Montgomery, og_. cit., p. 144. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Forests of the Committee on Agriculture on
the Subject of a Long Range Program for National Forests,
86th Congress, 1st Session, p. 39 (1959).
103395

F.2d 353, 358.

lO^Gandt v. Hardin, Civil No. 1334 (W.D. Michigan, 1969).
105Ibid.,

p. 12.
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lation strongly suggests the affirmative duty of the Forest
Service in that case.

In two more recent cases, federal

courts have granted jurisdiction for citizens to review the
mandatory actions of the Forest Service.-*-®®

Although there

is substantial precedent for courts allowing judicial review
under national forest legislation, the scope of that review
once granted is usually very narrow in that courts hesitate
to set aside administrative determinations.
Standing to Sue
"Standing" is the court determination of whether a
person is the proper party to seek court review and whether
there are the necessary adverse legal interests to the contro
versy.-^8

The principle of standing is based on a test made

up of two parts:

the "injury in fact" test, and whether the

interest is within the "zone of interests" to be protected
or regulated by statute or constitutional guarantee.1 hq The
106The West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island
Creek Coal Co., Civil No. 70182-E (N.D. West Virginia, June
1970). Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 CD, Colo
rado, February 1970).
107por development of this point, see Montgomery, op.
cit., pp. 142-51.
1®8R.

C. Keck, "Standing to Sue—-and Public Timber
Resources," Natural Resources Lawyer (Vol. 3, July 1970),
p. 444. K. C. Davis, "The Liberalized Law of Standing,"
University of Chicago Law Review (Vol. 37, 1970), p. 450.
lO^Barlow v. Collin, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970).
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most recent case on "citizens" standing in environmental
lawsuits, Sierra Club v. Morton, 1972,'^requires that the party
seeking review be himself among the injured," to sufficiently
lay the basis for standing under the Administrative Procedure
This case will be discussed in detail as it is cen

Act.-*--1-®

tral to the standing question.

The Lincoln Back Country Pro

tective Association (LBPA) could assert Section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act which allows judicial review
where citizens are adversely affected or aggrieved under
mandatory legislation.111
In the case Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Commission, 1965, the court said:
In order to insure that the FPC will adequately protect
the public interest in aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational aspects of power development, those who by
their activities and conduct have exhibited a special
interest in such areas, must be held to be included in
the class of 'aggrieved' parties under section 313(b).H2
The Lincoln Back Country Controversy centered on the public
interest in the "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational"
uses of national forest land that might have been destroyed
by extensive Forest Service development.
The District Judge in Road Review League, Town of
Bedford v. Boyd, 1967, expanded on the Scenic Hudson case by
saying:
I have based my decision (as to plaintiff's standing)
H O 9 2 S.Ct. 1361, 1366 (1972).
11:l5

U.S.C.A. 702.

112354

F.2d 608, 616 (1965).
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upon the implications, rather than the exact holding,
of the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in
Scenic Hudson.
The Administrative Procedure Act (5 USC 702) entitles
a person who is 'aggrieved fay agency action within the
meaning of the relevant statute' to obtain judicial re
view.
I have concluded that these provisions are sufficient,
under the principle of Scenic Hudson, to manifest a Con
gressional intent that towns, local civic organizations,
and conservation groups are to be considered 'aggrieved'
by agency action which allegedly has disregarded their
interests.H3
Persons who have "environmental" interests in protecting the
aesthetic and diverse quality of de facto wilderness in
national forests have been granted standing to appear in
Federal Court to challenge Forest Service actions in disre
gard of their interests.
Individual members of the LBPA would have to allege
particular injury before the LBPA would be granted standing
to represent those aggrieved persons.

On April 19, 1972, the

Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sierra Club,
a leading environmental organization, did not have standing
to challenge Forest Service approval of a thirty million
dollar resort development in California's Mineral King Valley,
a prized wilderness area within the national f o r e s t , T h e
113270

F. Supp. 660 (1967).

l-^Gandt v. Hardin, Civil No. 1334 (W.D, Michigan,
1969). The West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island
Creek Coal Co., Civil No. 70182-E (N.D. West Virginia, June
1970). Parker v. U.S., 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colorado, Feb
ruary 1970).
l-^Sierra club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (April 1972).
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Supreme Court held that the "injury in fact" test for standing,
"requires that the party seeking review be himself among the
injured.The Sierra Club, in its pleadings, did not
allege that it or its members would be affected in any of
their activities or pastimes by the resort development. The
Supreme Court in this same case explained that the interest
alleged to have been injured could be aesthetic, conservational, recreational, as well as economic.

And the Court said

that once judicial review was properly invoked by individual
members of the Sierra Club as "injured in fact" and within
the "zone of interests," then the organization "may argue the
public interest in support of his claim that the agency has
failed to comply with its statutory mandate."117

The LBPA

would have to allege individualized injury of its members to
obtain standing.

Since the membership of the LBPA is made up

of local residents and active users of the national forest
land in question, the procedural requirement of standing would
probably have not been difficult to satisfy.
Substantive Issues
The question of judicial intervention in the Lincoln
Back Country Controversy is moot today because of the recent
Congressional enactment of the Scapegoat Wilderness Bill.
The facts of the controversy are being used in this paper
116Ibid.,

p. 1366.

117Ibid.,

p. 1367.
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because they serve to demonstrate the dramatic conflict that
can result when the public is not involved in the public
administration of the national forests.

This section is

addressed to the particular allegations that could be raised
in court today if this controversy surfaced in 1973.
Given the facts of this controversy, it seems that
the U.S.F.S. consideration, adoption, and promotion of its
Long Range Plan and subsequent plans for development of
national forest lands which included the Lincoln Back Country
can be considered arbitrary, capricious, and in contravention
of their affirmative duty as trustee of the public trust in
national forest reserves.

Forest Service legislation since

the onset of the Lincoln Back Country Controversy in 1963
serves to further define the duties of the Forest Service as
I1O

trustee and, therefore, will be a part of this analysis.

The terms of this trust as seen in national forest
legislation and substantive trust law establish the powers
and mandatory duties on the part of the Forest Service to
protect and promote certain public uses in national forests.
One of those public uses under the Multiple Use Act of 1960
and the Wilderness Act of 1964 is wilderness.The Forest
Service generally ignored the alternative of wilderness
-'--'•^Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. 1131. National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190.
11916

U.S.C. 529.

16 U.S.C. 1131.
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management (with the exception of some 18,000 acres of
roadless "scenic area") until overwhelming political pres
sure was brought to bear through Congress pressuring the
agency to change its position.120

In addition, the Forest

Service failed to thoroughly study the resource and use capa
bilities for this forest area, especially in view of the
"public interest" in the de facto wilderness area that had
long been referred to as the Lincoln Back Country. The vari
ous public interests in this national forest land were not a
meaningful part of the administrative decision-making process.
Public hearings were not held on the initiative of the agency
nor upon request of the environmentalists concerned with the
management plans for the area.

There were public meetings

held for the purpose of the Forest Service to justify its
decision to develop the area.
The trustee relationship would put the Forest Service
in a position of giving reasons or justifications for its
actions, upon a prima facia^l showing by the Lincoln Back
Country Protective Association that Forest Service actions
were in disregard of the terms of the trust.

A prima facia

case would probably have been limited to showing disregard
of trustee duties and/or potential detrimental effect to
120see footnote 82 and accompanying text,
121"prima Facie Case" is one that has proceeded upon
sufficient proof to that stage where it will support finding
if evidence to contrary is disregarded. Black's Law Diction
ary, op. cit.
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public forest land.

Preparation by the public for such a

judicial confrontation would be expedited by the trust law
requirement that the trustee must provide records and accounts
of all trust activities, including how and why certain management decisions were made.122

The public, often being the

plaintiff bringing the suit, would have to sustain this
initial burden of proof.-^3

without a public trust admini

strative framework, citizens' access to information is costly
and often impossible
privy to it.

because government agencies are often

The public trust could serve to provide the

public with immediate access to information and could more
readily shift the burden of proof onto the agency for defend
ing its actions.
Judicial enforcement of the public trust is the weak
est link in the application of the public trust doctrine to
the environmental problems facing this country.

Sax explains

the significance of the doctrine in our courts by stating:
"the fundamental function of the courts in the public trust
area is one of democratization."^^

He explains the term

"democratization" by stating that the role of the courts is
not to "usurp" but rather to serve as a "catalyst" of the
•^•^Supra, p. 12.
j_s usually the rule of evidence that the party
asserting the affirmative side of an issue, most often the
plaintiff in a case, must sustain the burden of proof.
Black's Law Dictionary, op. cit.
0p#

cit., p. 561.
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1 nc
legislative process.

In this same vein, the role of the

public administrator is not to "usurp" but rather to serve
as a "catalyst" of the political process for reconciling
diverse public interests.
The application of the public trust doctrine must go
beyond judicial intervention of administrative decisions.
Government administration of environmental resources is where
most people should realize the day to day reality of the
democratic process.

The application of the doctrine to the

public administration of natural resources could provide
the necessary framework for preventing environmental degrada
tion, rather than trying to remedy despoilation after the fact.

•^^Ibid., p. 157.

CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS
The conceptual and legal support for applying the
public trust doctrine to government administration of nation
al forest lands should be somewhat clear in the reader's mind.
It is not yet clear, however, whether an administrative
framework based upon this doctrine would significantly
change (for the better) this "vast experiment in public
administration."

Would the trustee relationship, for ex

ample, provide a truly democratic basis for professional
management of forest resources?

How would the political

process work for determining the "public interests" (i.e.,
needs and wants

at any point in time) on a particular

parcel of public forest land?
to these questions.

There are no definite answers

The implications that can be drawn from

applying a trust relationship to national forest management
should, however, help direct our thinking.
Control over the ultimate allocation of forest re
sources and uses could be in the hands of the public, as
beneficiaries of the public trust in our national forests,
under the public trust doctrine.

One must hasten to add

that the Forest Service, i.e., trustee, would have the power
to manage the national forest lands for present productivity
59
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for the benefit of the American people and to guarantee the
alternative use options for future generations of Americans.
The implication

is that public interest groups would have

to alter the terms of the trust through Congress to provide
for a particular use of public forest lands inconsistant
with present and long-term capabilities of the land.

The

Forest Service would only be responsible for forest manage
ment based upon a productive and continuing trust for the
impartial benefit of all present and possible future "public
interests."
Forest lands are most often capable of supporting
varied resources and uses beneficial to different segments
of the public.

Trade-offs and compromises are inevitable

under these circumstances.

Alternative management plans can

be formulated, with public participation, under the direction
of the professional forest administrators.

These plans should

reflect the physical and biological carrying capacity of the
forest land in question.

The determination of which plan

should be implemented is primarily a political question of
reconciling divergent public interests.
Under the public trust doctrine, these value deter
minations would usually be left to the political process.
The public administrator would be catalytic to these pro
cesses, but would not be accountable for determining or recon
ciling the needs and wants of the interested public.

The

Forest Service, then, would only "register" the public
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decision as to the particular mix of resources and uses
needed.

If that decision was commensurate with the carrying

capacity of the land, which it should be if public interest
groups participated in the initial Forest Service planning
process, the agency would implement the management alterna
tive chosen by the public.
A strength of the public trust framework for admini
stration of environmental resources is that the costs attached
to the planning process (with direct public involvement)
would likely be social and economic in nature, rather than
being detrimental to the forest ecosystem.

When the public

administrator has the power to protect the trust property
from "invasion," and does not have to compromise the capa
bility of the trust property, which could likely occur through
political involvement by public administrators, then the pub
lic administration of a "quality" environment is possible.
If the particular public interests—this is assuming
they are identifiable—are not able to reach a compromise as
to the "best" mix of resources and uses for all publics parti
cipating in the "administrative" planning process described
above, then the public would have to turn to available legisla
tive or judicial remedies.

As stated earlier, the public

administrator is not in the position to "usurp" the role of a
politician, legislator, or judge.

The public administrator,

at best, is able to initiate public involvement and interest
in determining what might be in the citizen's"best interest."
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In the case of the Forest Service, the professional forester is
faced with the task of managing forest land to maximize pre
sent public benefits and protect future alternative uses,
rather than being distracted by the impossible task of recon
ciling the diversity of public interests in that forest land.
Another strength of the public trust doctrine is found
in the "checks and balances" available to carry out the trust
intent.

Both the trustee and the beneficiary have responsi

bilities under trust law for continuance of the trust within
the terms of the particular trust.

The authority for main

taining and protecting the trust is vested in the powers and
duties of the trustee, rights of the beneficiaries, and ulti
mately in the courts of this land.

The sharply defined

responsibilities under trust law would allow for effective
judicial enforcement, if necessary, of the trustee's duties
in carrying out the trust intent.

The trustee, on the other

hand, has the power to protect and make productive the trust
property.

These checks and balances are within the best

traditions of our democratic form of government.
Without the public trust framework of public rights
and administrative powers to promote and protect our national
forests, the elements of representative democracy seem

to be

missing, and the social and economic costs often attached to
resource allocation decisions are taking a significant toll
on the natural environment and indirectly on man himself.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated the conceptual and legal
basis for the application of a public trust doctrine to the
public administration of national forest reserves. In addi
tion, the paper offers the trustee relationship, elements of
which are already inherent in the Forest Service management
of national forests, as a meaningful framework for putting
the "public" back into public administration and limiting
public administrators to a role of catalytic agent to
political process.

the

Biological and physical knowledge of

the environment is an important factor in managing any
natural environment; but, the human wants and needs within
that environment—and which can best be defined by those
very inhabitants—are as important and must be considered in
the environmental management decisions.

If the public is

not able to determine what is best for themselves, then there
is always the risk that government bureaucracies will dictate
a life-style different from what man wants.
The "environmental Seventies" could be marked by the
large number of citizens concerned with and wanting to do
something about restoring and maintaining environmental
quality for present and future use.
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Government agencies
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have an opportunity to capitalize on this public demand for
a meaningful role in the administrative decision-making pro
cess.

What is needed, then, is a clear statement of "defined"

responsibility delegated to governmental agencies and a cor
responding right by the public for working together to achieve
a quality environment.
The public trust doctrine delegates the responsibility
for promoting and protecting trust property.

This doctrine

can serve to bridge the fundamental problems facing both
the public and the Forest Service in managing the national
forests today.

Citizens concerned with the state of the en

vironment feel they have lost control to government agencies
in effecting meaningful change for meeting public needs and
wants.

On the other hand, the government agencies have such

broad, sweeping delegations of power that they are being held
responsible for man's negative impact on the natural environ
ment.

The public trust in the national forests sets out the

duties and powers of the Forest Service, and the rights of
the public, for a complementary management effort. The
responsibility on the parts of both parties for environmental
management of forest resources is present under the public
trust doctrine.
Judicial recognition of the public trust in environ
mental resources is not likely in the next few years, when
it will be needed most.

Bernard Cohen referred to the state

of the public trust doctrine in the context of the famous
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civil rights case of Brown v. Board of Education,1-26
stated:

when

he

"It will take scholarly research, imaginative plead

ing, skilled advocacy, and an informed court to hand down
the 'Brown* of environmental rights."127 ^s

a

practical

matter, few lawyers know about the possible application of
the public trust doctrine.

If they know about it, few are

risking the immediate objectives of their clients for the
possibility of establishing a landmark precedent for a public
trust xn the envxronment.1 9ft
The public trust doctrine will probably have to be
explicitly stated in a legislative enactment or as a consti
tutional amendment.

Public trust legislation should contain

at least three elements if it stands a chance of proving to
be an effective framework for public administration of
environmental resources and uses.

First, the nature and

extent of the trust must be sharply delineated.

If the

distinction between the "subject matter of the trust" and the
"public interest in the trust" is clear, there is less threat
to proprietory interests by government and private individuals
126349

U.S. 294 (1955).

l^Cohen, ojo. cit., p. 392.
128it has been noted that attorneys concerned with
establishing environmental policy through the courts are able
to plead alternative theories in their briefs, just for the
purpose of covering themselves in the event a judge does not
accept one of the doctrines used to support a client's posi
tion.
129Supra,

pp. 14, 24, 37.
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Second, there should be an express designation of the trustee
and the duties and powers necessary for effective management
of the trust.

For example, the limitation of trustee respon

sibility to managing present productivity and guaranteeing
future public uses could be a part of this statement.
Finally, the beneficiaries of the public trust should be
defined as those persons, in their capacity as members of
the public, who are intended to benefit from the trust.
Rights and accompanying responsibilities of the beneficiary
class must be stated.

For example, the beneficiaries should

have the right to enforce the terms of the trust and the
duties of the trustee in equity.

It could also be stated

that the beneficiary has no right to infringe upon the
trustee's duties to reasonably carry out the trust intent,
except insofar as the management affects the receipt of
proceeds by the beneficiary.
The public trust doctrine is not a panacea, but is
simply a framework for combining the concerns of citizens
with the professional management by government administra
tors for working together on the problems of man's interaction
with the environment.

It is a delegation of clearly defined

responsibilities to these parties, both very necessary for
determining the"public good"in the allocation of natural
resources.

It is a framework that allows for changing prior

ities in public policy and for constant alteration in the
terras of the trust through legislation.

It is a mechanism

67

by which the agency has flexibility to apply its expertise,
and the public has the right to actively participate in the
determination of their "best interests" through the allocation
of natural resources.

It is the public right to enforce the

trust, and the agency power to promote and protect the trust.
The public can become an integral part of the public
administration of the national forests by implementation of
the doctrine of public trust.

Government agencies stand to

gain by encouraging the public to accept the.responsibility
that accompanies the right to participate in forest-resource
allocation decisions.

Citizens stand to gain by satisfying

their needs and wants in public forest lands through their
participation in forest management for their own best inter
ests.

The Forest Service must put its trust in the people

before that agency will realize its potential as professional
manager of the trust the people have put in our national
forests.
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